Introduction
In the January 2003 issue of the United States Naval Institute's Proceedings, Dr. Milan Vego, Professor of Operations at the Naval War College, warns, "Network Centric Warfare (NCW) increasingly is becoming a new orthodoxy -a set of beliefs that cannot seriously be challenged."
1 He and many other critics contend that NCW theorists fail to consider "Clausewitzian thoughts on the nature of war, the relationship between policy and use of military power, and the effect of fog of war and friction." 2 They lament the perceived emphasis on tactics and targeting to the apparent exclusion of operational art, and warn that command and control (C 2 ) is becoming increasingly centralized. 3 What they don't say is that NCW is a bad idea, that it is unachievable, or that there is an alternate path for the transformation of the Defense Department advo- Some proponents of NCW seem to believe that simply "netting the force" will accrue the benefits promised by the Information Age. Nothing could be further from the truth. Critics like Dr.
Vego have identified some serious consequences that, unless addressed, threaten to nullify the advantages of NCW.
The Winds of Change
The 
IT Proliferation
The common element in all the discussions of NCW is information technology (IT) (es- The top priority of John Stenbit, the current ASD C 3 I and DOD's Chief Information Officer, is fielding information systems to bridge the gap between the "sensors" and the "shooters"
so that "anybody can get any information at any time." 18 Commanders are taking him up on his offer. Having "the picture" on the admiral's desk used to mean getting him a good print from that day's F-14 Tomcat reconnaissance flight. Now it means having the COP (common operational picture) on the high-definition flatscreen display that dominates his desktop. Today's COP (as controversial a topic as NCW itself) can range from situational displays with unsophisticated symbols (e.g., NTDS, the Navy Tactical Data System) to theater quality audiovisual experiences incorporating 3-D graphic symbols, video, and real-time feeds from UAVs and troops on the ground (e.g., the Navy's Area Air Defense Coordinator (AADC) System). In command centers throughout the military, more manpower is spent on maintaining and updating these displays (manually and automatically) for the commander than is spent actually analyzing the enemy's actions. 19 For now, netting the force means ensuring that the COP (accurate or not) looks the same throughout the force. and retask scarce national assets on a whim-the current reachback architecture is a tightly regulated resource that supports primarily high-level activities. Though significant funds have been expended to develop, test and field IT tools that can enable geographically dispersed "workerbees" to collaborate over vast distances, these nascent capabilities are only now migrating to military users in large numbers. Furthermore, because of the bandwidth tax incurred by these tools, priority for their use normally goes to the commander and his staff, not front line troops.
Any requirement in competition with the general's daily video teleconference (VTC) will lose.
On the positive side, these collaborative tools helped foster closer working relationships between DOD and other government agencies. In fact, the invention of the Internet (the water- Myers, p. 40. ad hoc nature of the interagency community involvement in political and military coordination and enables…collaboration to integrate all elements of national power to more effectively engage the enemy. 24 Thus, in both these IT-enabled trends (reachback and interagency), authority is migrating to the level where the coordination is done, instead of down to the levels where IT has enabled increased collaboration. Other factors, especially political factors, also have contributed to this trend.
Warfare's New Face
In the latter half of the 20 th century, the world entered an era of Limited War with increasing levels of political oversight. Due to the era of its birth, America is intimately familiar with the concept of Total War. The American Revolution, the American Civil War and the Great
Wars of the first half of the 20 th century gripped our nation in total war, but World War II was the last time that the United States was willing to use its entire might in conflict, culminating with the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs. 25 The two devastating blasts preceded the surrender of Japan, bringing to an end the last total war in the modern era. The Nu- as the selection of targets for Air Force and Navy air strikes, was retained by the political leadership in Washington, D.C. 27 Once again, the heavy oversight was intentional-put in place to keep the conflict from escalating to a total war with China or the Soviet Union.
During operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, fear of escalation was replaced by other political concerns. In its report to Congress, the Government Accounting Office noted that political concerns caused air operations in Kosovo to depart from established doctrinal concepts. These departures were driven by the overarching desire to maintain alliance cohesion. That cohesion was based on the priorities of limiting collateral damage and alliance casualties, as well as limiting the duration of the campaign.
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While the Nuclear Age spawned a return to limited war, the Information Age has had its own unique impact on the conduct of military operations. The widespread availability of IT is adding weight to the perceived requirement of commanders at all levels to have a high-fidelity, "ground truth" picture of the battlespace. The provision of tactical information offers upperlevel commanders a tempting opportunity not only to monitor operations as they unfold, but to add their own "two-cents worth," as well. Lieutenant Commander Curt Copley, a senior intelligence director at U.S. European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, points out the dangers of this well-intentioned "help":
Each level of war is complex, and if a decision maker abandons his level even briefly to make decisions at a lower level, effectiveness will be lost. This problem is not new to warfare, but the vast amount of information that network-centric operations provides raises the stakes. As senior leaders wrestle with the political implications of their operations, they are being provided with information of a much higher fidelity than ever before. However, CNN and other news media outlets continue to provide timely coverage of world events via their communications channels. These phenomena are exacerbating the propensity for senior leaders to pull decision authority up the chain of command. Dr. Vego noted at least one aspect of this situation:
Having a common operating picture [provided by the proliferation of IT] will lead operational commanders to be increasingly involved in purely tactical decisions, instead of focusing on the operational and strategic aspects of the situation within their respective areas of responsibility. Grant, Organizational orientation determines the degree of uncertainty a commander is willing to tolerate. Van Creveld declares that the history of warfare is an endless quest of decreasing the "realm of uncertainty, resulting in a race between more information and the ability of technology to keep up with it." Thus the choice between centralized and decentralized control involves the distribution of uncertainty.
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The bow wave dysfunction specifically undermines perhaps the most attractive elements of the NCW concept-speed of command and self-synchronization. Cebrowski and Garstka define these concepts as follows:
Speed of Command is the process by which a superior information position is turned into a competitive advantage. Self-Synchronization is the ability of a well-informed force to organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up.
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Both of these concepts hinge on decentralized control and information sharing to create opportunities for leverage based on the effects desired by the commander. Those opportunities are not necessarily available in a top-down command orientation.
The Wake of Inexperienced Decision Makers
In the wake of the ever-increasing tendency to centralize decision authority is a condition that threatens to stifle the initiative of lower-echelon decision-makers. This centralization strips away the opportunity for lower-echelon officers to hone their skills in applying operational art.
The advances in IT that caused the bow wave of decision authority will not be able to transplant the experiences of current senior commanders to their subordinates who will someday take their place. As the pool of knowledge in the lower echelons dries up, fewer officers will be available to contribute to evolving operational art for the 21 st century. 38 Roman, p. 10.
39 Cebrowski, Cutting "It is not merely the tools of warfare but the organizations that wield them that make for revolutionary change in war." While technological changes have catalyzed some innovations, they are not necessary or sufficient for transformation.
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For NCW to fulfill its promise, today's commanders and doctrine czars must fight the bow wave and create organizational structures that exploit the power of networked forces. They must empower lower command levels in the JTF or create something different than a JTF for joint force employment. Above all, they must accept uncertainty at their level to facilitate greater certainty at the warfighting end. This approach has proven successful in the past:
40 Money, p. 5. Following the breakout at St Lo, France, generals Collins and Quesada created a shortcut in the targeting procedures to support VII Corps' exploitation of the fluid battlefield. General Quesada gave some of his pilots FM radios and had them ride with lead Army tanks. In the process, they reduced the role of the upper chain of command. General Collins and Quesada delegated the target approval to the lowest level. No one told these soldiers they had to do this. These commanders assumed risk. Without approved procedures or prescriptive doctrine, Generals Quesada and Collins demonstrated flexibility and adaptability. They succeeded because they trusted each other's judgment and experience. As a result, they accomplished the mission and saved American lives.
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While the JTF has proven a reliable joint force employment mechanism, several efforts have looked at less static forms of C 2 structures to better employ the power of a truly net-centric force. [E]ngagement decisions in a fully netted system can only be successful if the decision-maker can craft a tailored presentation of the infospace, and share that information with other decision-makers throughout the force. The decisions which allow these commanders to operate in spite of uncertainty are the keys to success. 44 For NCW to work, commanders must be willing to accept a certain level of uncertainty (and therefore risk) at their level to enable their subordinates to create opportunities at the tactical level. While many DOD organizations focus on the information technology part of NCW, the information itself receives anemic attention. With the emphasis on battlespace knowledge and shared situational awareness, the pursuit of the COP places a premium on ensuring information availability and information delivery, not on information content and information tailoring.
General Myers recently commented:
Moving data faster is no longer the issue-getting the right data to the right people is. When this is achieved, components gain the insight needed to fulfill the commander's intent in an unpredictable environment. Improved joint C 4 ISR will allow U.S. forces to exploit a decision cycle-to observe, decide, and act-faster than an adversary. And as history documents, the side that does this faster, wins. 45 In Command Concepts, a RAND study conducted in 1999 for the Secretary of Defense, Carl H.
Builder concurred, theorizing that:
The most essential functions of command and control are conveying (to subordinates) and altering (for superiors) command concepts. Ideally, then, battle commanders need only convey their vision of the operation to their subordinates. Developing a true NCW capability requires developing joint systems that can relate blue force positions to sensor information to enable decisive engagements. The commander's vision (or command concept) should be embedded in the systems' doctrine, so that subordinates can execute engagements without a "mother-may-I" call to higher authority.
Several candidate technologies are already being tested and fielded by the Services.
Grenadier Brat, a BFT capability, received high praise during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM for its ability to keep track of Special Forces and other ground units in Afghanistan, permitting U.S. bombers and cruise missiles to strike targets in close proximity to friendly forces. These technologies are key to enabling future forces to grab NCW's brass rings of speed of command and self-synchronization.
Charting A New Course
The Bow Wave of Decision Authority is a predictable outcome of a haphazard approach to operationalizing Network-Centric Warfare. By concentrating on the information technology drivers for innovation, the military has created the dreaded 10,000-mile screwdriver. To temper the temptation to tinker from afar, new organizational structures and information tailoring tech-49 Ibid, p. 59.
niques need to be conceived, developed and tested through experimentation. Since netted forces are a key enabler to the Rapid Decisive Operations and Effects Based Operations Concepts, JFCOM should take the lead in this development by identifying the critical components necessary to achieve NCW's concepts of speed of command and self-synchronization. JFCOM should fully investigate these concepts in its Pinnacle, Olympic and Zenith series of joint experiments.
JFCOM should also encourage and support the Service efforts aimed at realizing the promise of Network-Centric Warfare. Admiral Cebrowski's theory was visionary in its scope. It will take visionaries to see it through to fruition.
